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ENDING CONFLICT: RAISING THE COSTS OF DEFECTION IN AFRICAN
FAILED STATES
Brian Crisher, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2007
This paper views the civil conflicts in African failed states through the lens of
game theory. From the numerous peace agreements and cease-fires that have been
broken in these conflicts, it is clear that defecting from such agreements,is often more
profitable than abiding by them. Why is this so? Furthermore, what can be done to
raise the costs of defection and therefore promote cooperation amongst the fighting
parties? This paper proposes that the international community has the ability to do
just this through one-sided intervention.
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INTRODUCTION

Long-term civil conflicts have plagued Sub-Saharan Africa ever since
decolonization. At times these conflicts have rendered the government impotent to
the point of failure. This relatively new political phenomenon of failed states has
received much attention from the international community as it scrambles to alleviate
both humanitarian and international security disasters. The conflicts in Angola, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia alone have cost the lives of
more than 4 million people since 1992. 1 As a result, interventions are undertaken
either directly or indirectly to bring about peace. However, the growing list of broken
cease-fires and peace agreements show that ending conflicts through negotiation is a
difficult task at best. One study estimates that, "the parties to civil war engage in
formal negotiations in about half the cases but successfully implement a negotiated.
settlement ending the war in less than a fifth of all civil wars. "2 Much remains to be
understood about the calculations of those that choose to defect from agreements.
What accounts for this inability to end conflict?
The conflict resolution literature addresses this question from various
viewpoints. One viewpoint deals with post-conflict reconstruction. The basic
argument in these works is that how the international community reconstructs war
tom states influences whether the conflict resumes. In particular, there is a significant
focus on transforming failed states into democracies. Paris (2004) posits that
1

J. Anyu Ndumbe and Babalola Cole, "The Illicit Diamond Trade, Civil Conflicts, and Terrorism in
Africa," Mediterranean Quarterly, (Spring 2005), 52.
2
Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Civil Wars: What We Don't Know," Global Governance, 9:2 (2003), 247-248.
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democracy "would shift societal conflicts away from the battlefield and into the
peaceful arena of electoral politics, thereby replacing the breaking of heads with the
counting of heads."3 However, while creating stable market democracies is an
appropriate long-term solution, as is often the case, theory is different then reality.
Ottaway (2003) supports this conclusion, contending that, "The democratic
reconstruction model is a well-intentioned response to a growing problem;" however,
"while appealing in theory, [it] is proving very difficult and very costly in practice."4
The nature of the failed states hinders the successful transfer to democracy.
Ottaway (2003) and Jeong (2005) both note the challenge of implementing
democratic and market reforms in states that lack the institutional capacity to deal
with their destabilizing effects. Jeong further notes that, "the need for political
stability and the desire to reform the institutions of political oppression may be
opposed to each other." 5 While these authors offer an interesting insight into the
reconstruction of failed states, ultimately they presume that conflicts have ended.
However, from the growing list of broken peace agreements this is a false
presumption.
Other scholars have sought to explain this list of failed peace agreements by
focusing on the foundations of the conflicts rather than the post-war reconstruction of
the state. A particular question of importance in these works is why certain conflicts
persist. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) introduce the classic greed versus grievance
Roland Paris, At War's End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5.
Marina Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices," International Studies
Perspectives, 4 (2003), 314-315.
5
Ibid, 36.
3
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model. They find that as rebels gain access to commodities their grievance
transforms into greed as they develop a capacity to export. War diamonds and
narcotics are common examples of these commodities.6 Fearon (2004) supports these
findings and through quantitative analysis finds two main factors that prolong
conflict. The first is the same as Collier and Hoeffler's greed factor. The second
factor is what he terms "sons of the soil conflict" that are "land or natural resource
conflicts between a peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a
dominant ethnic group." 7 While effective at explaining prolonged conflict, these
authors do not offer solutions to ending the cycles of violence. Fearon does however
advise policy makers to seek international monitoring strategies that allow for
mutually advantageous commitments.8 While logical, real world implementation of
this advice is difficult. One prominent issue would be the continued trade of war
commodities. Other solutions are still needed.
Some studies in the conflict literature seek to find the conditions conducive to
ending conflict. Addison and Murshed (2004) contend that credibility and reputation
are crucial to understanding prolonged conflict. Through a game theory analysis,
they find that reputation matters and even evolves throughout the conflict. An honest
or dishonest rebel leader will determine whether low or high level conflict will

6

Paul Collier and Amee Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers, 56:4
(2004).
7
James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?," Journal ofPeace
Research, 41:3 (2004), 277.
8
Ibid, 298.
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persist. 9 While studies such as Addison and Murshed's focus on the rebel side ofthe
equation, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) choose to focus on the state. They hypothesize
that a state with high capacity will limit the possibility ofrebel victory. However,
high capacity does not guarantee victory for the state but does increase the probability
ofa negotiated settlement.10 While these results are indeed helpful, states such as
Sierra Leone and Somalia show that prolonged conflict can lead to state failure and an
inability to enforce effectively any type ofnegotiated settlement. The authors offer
no discussion as to this effect in their analysis and therefore its applicability to failed
states in Africa is somewhat limited.
The question of ending conflict remains. Using the language ofgame theory,
this study asks why the cost ofdefecting from peace agreements is lower than abiding
by them. In other words, what are the incentives for continuing a conflict that has
reached stalemate? Axelrod (1984) highlights the problem ofincreasing the
likelihood ofcooperation in prisoner dilemma-like situations. One problem in
particular is that participants often pursue short-term gains rather than waiting for
long-terms gains that are by no means guaranteed.11 One solution offered by Axelrod
is to alter the payoffs faced by the participants.12 With this solution in mind, the
critical question becomes, how can the international community significantly raise the

Tony Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," Journal of
Peace Research, 39:4 (2002), 498.
1
° Karl R. DeRouen Jr. and David Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,"
Journal ofPeace Research, 41 :3 (2004), 308.
11
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution ofCooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 126.
12
Ibid, 133.
9
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costs of defection to the point were cooperation becomes the best strategy and leaders
honor peace agreements?
HYPOTHESES
Borrowing from Collier and Hoeffler, greed and grievance are the two main
factors that fuel civil conflict. In African failed states, it is common for elements of
both factors to be present. Grievance often manifests itself through ethnic tensions
while greed usually manifests itself through rent-seeking mechanisms and the control
of natural resources. Given that, if the international community can raise the costs of
defection through intervention, under what conditions will this intervention be
successful?
The primary hypothesis for this study is that intervention will be most
effective in conflicts where: First, agreements recognize that involved parties are
motivated by economic incentives and second, the international community actively
supports only one party. In conflicts driven by greed, the pursuit of monetary gains
outweighs survival and favors a policy of defection. However, if intervention alters
this calculation by denying access to resources and decreasing the chances of
survival, this creates an environment more conducive to cooperation.
An alternative hypothesis is that ethnic competition will supercede any
incentive structure created through intervention. The logic behind this hypothesis
being that if grievance is the main incentive for continuing the conflict it will be
difficult to create a strategic environment that promotes cooperation. This occurs

5

when one of the parties believes its survival is at stake regardless of intervention and
has little trust in the ability of either its opponent or the international community to
ensure its survival.
CASE SELECTION
Sub-Saharan Africa is rife with available countries for analysis. The countries
selected for this study were done so as randomly as possible to limit selection among
the dependent variable. In instances where multiple conflicts inhabited a single
region, one conflict was chosen that represented the region. Therefore, the various
cases represent a cross-section of African failed states.
Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and
Somalia will serve as the cases against which this study's argument is tested. Each
case shares some similar characteristics. They suffered a collapse in their national
governments and were tom by years of civil conflict. There were also important
differences among the failed states. The first is regional, with cases representing
Southern, West, Central and East Africa, respectively. Secondly, the cases
correspond to the various types of conflicts that affect failed states. While Sierra
Leone was primarily a revolutionary conflict, the DRC is a case where revolutionary
conflict combined with ethnic tensions. Somalia and Angola are both cases where
ethnic tensions and genocide accompanied their conflicts. Finally, the cases represent
different levels of regional and international involvement within their conflicts. Prior
to the 2006 Ethiopian invasion, there was relatively little regional intervention in
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Somalia and only a feeble attempted international intervention between 1992 and
1995. In the DRC it is perhaps easier to ask which of its neighbors was not actively
involved in the conflict as the international community remained an indirect actor.
Meanwhile Angola fell victim to Cold War intervention from Cuba and South Africa
in the first phase of its civil war. Lastly, Sierra Leone's civil war was launched from
Liberia with the aid of Charles Taylor and saw the involvement of large contingents
of both regional and international peacekeepers.
The structure of the case studies will be as follows. A brief look into the
conflict's origins is followed by a discussion of the ensuing stalemate and broken
peace agreements. From this point, the various incentive structures facing the actors
are examined to illuminate reasons for defection. Finally, observations on the
effectiveness of intervention will show how it is possible for the international
community to alter the strategic environment.
CASES
Sierra Leone
In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), under the command of
Foday Saybannah Sankoh, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. An extension of
Liberia's civil war, the conflict was rooted in deep socio-economic divisions. The
first attempt at peace occurred in November 1996, as the parties signed a peace
agreement in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. After a brief lull, the violence resumed and was
followed by a military coup in Freetown. A second attempt at peace occurred with
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the Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999. The agreement quickly broke down as the
RUF began killing and kidnapping United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. Finally, a
ceasefire was signed in November 2000 that reaffirmed the Lome agreement.
At the time of negotiations, clearly the conflict was a stalemate. Neither side
was militarily strong enough to impose its will. One would assume that stalemate
would lead to negotiations to solidify any gains made. Indeed, this seemingly was the
case as multiple peace agreements were signed. Nevertheless, despite large
contingents of both Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and
UN peacekeepers, the conflicts resumed. What accounts for this?
Sierra Leone's civil war is inextricably linked with war diamonds. While one
might try to argue their importance has been exaggerated, this is not the case. These
diamonds were a major source of the socio-economic conditions that triggered the
war in the first place. Adebajo (2002) argues that the young fighters of the RUF "saw
the war as a chance to plunder, mine diamonds, and perhaps replace the ruling class
in Freetown." 13 Additionally, the RUF was able to recruit disgruntled government
soldiers from the same lower classes that sought to gain from the diamond revenues.
Early in the war, the RUF was able to capitalize on the military weakness of
the government and seize control of the diamond fields. This income stream allowed
the rebels to finance their activities and made defection from the peace agreements an
attractive option. The reasons for this are simple. It is neatly impossible for the
development of any peace agreement allowing the RUF a peacetime income equal to
13 Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002),
79.
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their wartime income. With the government unable to break the stalemate, there was
no incentive structure to force the RUF into abandoning their weapons. Therefore, a
rational calculation dictates that the payoff from maintaining access to diamond fields
through conflict outweighs honoring any agreement made with the government.
In April 1998, the international community finally intervened in the conflict.
ECOWAS's Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) invaded Freetown in order to
restore the government overthrown by the military coup. This was eventually
followed by UN peacekeepers in 1999 and 2000 that would come to total nearly
17,500 troops. While initially deployed to enforce the ceasefire, the mandate of the
UN troops was expanded to the protection of the government. These forces were,
however, ineffective. ECOMOG, while succeeding in restoring the government in
Freetown, did so at the cost of nearly 7,000 civilians and two-thirds of the city
leveled. 14 The UN peacekeepers were humiliated as they were disarmed by the RUF.
Compounding this were attacks by the RUF that killed UN peacekeepers.
Highlighting the ineffectiveness of these forces is the fact that they were
adding to the rebels' incentives for continuing the conflict. As the RUF battled
ECOMOG and UN forces, they were able to confiscate their weapons and supplies
following victories. Additionally, they were able to divert humanitarian aid that was
meant for those most affected by the fighting. Not only were the peacekeeping forces
contributing to the RUF through their defeats, they also were not immune from the
pursuit of diamonds. Anecdotal evidence exists that tells of peacekeeping forces,
14

J. Peter Pham, "Democracy by Force?: Lessons from the Restoration of the State in Sierra Leone,"
The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Winter/Spring 2005), 134.
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especially the Nigerians, trading their arms to RUF forces in return for both diamonds
and cash. 15
As internal dissent and defeats began to break up the UN peacekeeping force,
a contingent of British paratroopers was deployed to Freetown in 2000. This force
protected the government, strengthened the resolve of the UN forces and began
training a new Sierra Leonean army. Additionally, the UN expanded the mandate of
its forces to allow for the direct confrontat_ion with the RUF. These factors, along
with the capture of the RUF leader Sankoh, altered the strategic environment in Sierra
Leone.
The RUF now found itself without a leader facing a proactive UN force and a
British contingent that did not appear to be leaving the country in the near future.
Indeed the strategic environment was altered and the prospects for survival began to
outweigh the possible riches to be gained through war. Soon after, in November 2000
the final peace agreement was signed. Now with 17,500 peacekeepers in the country
and the RUF finally disarming, the conflict dwindled. Presidential and parliamentary
elections, relatively free of violence, were held in May 2002 and the conflict in Sierra
Leone was officially seen as ended.
The Democratic Republic of Congo
In 1994, the genocide of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda was halted after Tutsi
fighters gained control of the government. Subsequently, more than one million

15

Ibid, 139.
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Hutus fled to the Congo. With the consent of the DRC's leader Mobutu Seso Seke,
Hutu dissidents launched attacks against the ruling Tutsi government in Rwanda.
These incidents, along with widespread anti-Mobutu sentiments led to a concerted
effort by both insurgent groups and foreign governments to remove Mobutu from
power in 1996. Following a brief war, Laurent Kabila, leader of the Alliance des
forces democratiques pour la liberation (AFDL), became leader of the DRC in May
1997. Playing upon anti-Tutsi sentiments within the country, Kabila removed Tutsi
members of his cabinet and ordered all foreign troops out of the country shortly after
his ascension to power. By August 2, 1998, Rwanda and Uganda set off an anti
Kabila movement that embroiled the country in its second war since 1996.
The second war was characterized by its complexity. Not only did it involve
numerous foreign actors, but also internal and external insurgent groups. At the
beginning of the conflict, these groups had legitimate security claims for becoming
directly involved. Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola all wanted to deny rebel groups a
staging area for attacks against their respective countries. Additionally, Tutsi groups
within the DRC were fearful ofKabila's new policies and began fighting for what
they felt was their survival. Unlike the fast-moving decisive first war, the second war
quickly bogged down in stalemate.
Negotiations on a peace settlement began during the first war, but Kabila's
strong military position ensured his unwillingness to compromise. With the outbreak
of the second war, negotiations were renewed. What resulted was the Lusaka
Accords in 1999 that called for peace between the various factions, disarming the
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militias, a UN peacekeeping force, and the beginning of an Inter-Congolese dialogue
(ICD). All parties were guilty of defection from the accords. Therefore, the situation
on the ground failed to improve and the conflict continued.
The mineral wealth of the country was a major factor behind the defections.
The DRC, like many of it neighbors, has both the fortune and misfortune of being
endowed with abundant natural resources. Diamonds, gold, timber, and coltan are all
plentiful. These resources became even more tempting for all actors involved as the
conflict reached a stalemate. In short, greed replaced the grievance that sparked the
second war.
Evidence of this greed is plentiful. For instance, Rwanda and Uganda prior to
their invasion of the DRC had no history of diamond production. However, for the
period between 1997 and 2001 they reported $4.75 and $3.5 million in exports
respectively. 16 Additionally, it has been estimated that towards the end of 2000 the
Rwandan army was selling coltan for as much as $20 million per month. 17 Rwanda
and Uganda were not the only participants to gain. Anti-Kabila rebels used the
monetary gain from mineral exports to purchase arms and fill their leaders' coffers.
Onusumba, leader of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), admitted his
organization was able to raise $200,000 a month in diamond exports and up to $1

16

Emizet F. Kisangani, "Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Mosaic of Insurgent
Groups," International Journal of World Peace, 20:3 (September 2003), 68.
17
Ola Olsson and Heather C. Fors, "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Journal ofPeace Research, 41 :3
(2004), 326.
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million in coltan exports. 18 All sides were benefiting from the mineral wealth of the
Congo.
At the signing of the Lusaka Accords, the incentive structure favored a
prolonged conflict. The anti-Kabila rebels could not operate without the backing of
Rwanda and Uganda. However, due to Angola and Zimbabwe intervening on
Kabila's behalf, the rebels and their foreign backers were unable to gain a victory
despite their early successes. While Kabila was able to stave off disaster, the help he
received was not enough to defeat his enemies. Adding to this was the continued
fractionalization of the RCD and the infighting that occurred between the splinter
groups. The conflict produced a strategic environment in which no actor was able to
break the stalemate. Since no group was able to take direct control over the valuable
resources, they began to appropriate through pillaging and extraction. 19 Each group
feared that if they chose to cooperate, their stake in the spoils would be lost to those
that defected. 20 This meant a continued military presence that ensured access to
minerals and an extended conflict.
The strategic environment finally changed with the assassination of Kabila in
January 2001 and his son Joseph taking control of the country. The elder Kabila,
much like his predecessor Mobutu, was a kleptocratic ruler unwilling to compromise
with rebel groups in order to maintain his firm grip on power. Joseph however was
interested in bringing about an end to the conflict and placing the DRC on the path to

Kisangani, 69.
Olsson, 327.
2
° Kisangani, 12.
18

19
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democracy. 21 With strong diplomatic pressure being exerted against the foreign
occupiers and the promise of a large peacekeeping force, various agreements were
signed that reaffirmed the principles of the Lusaka Accords. 22 Neither Rwanda nor
Uganda were willing to challenge the nearly 18,000 strong UN force and were
pleased with Kabila's willingness to pursue and detain foreign rebel groups. Without
this direct support, the anti-Kabila groups' fighting ability were greatly diminished.
They had little choice but to cooperate with the government and finally the Global
and Inclusive Agreement was signed. This agreement contained provisions for the
transitional period, with extensive power-sharing arrangements in the political and
military spheres.
The agreements held and the main violence ceased. However, fighting
continued between various ethnic groups and the uprising in Kinshasa that followed
the 2007 elections highlights that the country has yet to stabilize fully and the
reoccurrence of conflict remains a threat.
Angola
The origins of the Angolan civil war date back to its independence from
Portugal in 1975. Following independence, the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA/current government), the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA) all fought for control of the country. As the FNLA fell to the·
21
22

Olsson, 362.
Kisangani, 63-64.

14

wayside, Cold War politics entered the fray with the United States allying with
UNITA and the Soviet Union allying with the MPLA. Following the end of the Cold
War, strong international pressure forced the parties into the Bicesse Agreement in
1991. The agreement held until UNITA leader Savimbi declared the 1992 .elections a
fraud and plunged the country into its deadliest fighting to date. A second attempt at
peace was made in 1994 with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. The Protocol
proved as successful as its predecessor with both low-level conflict and the absence
of Savimbi from the capital undermining the Protocol. By 1998, implementing the
Protocol was abandoned and full-scale conflict resumed.
In the conflict during the Cold War and the mid-to-late 1990s, neither side had
a clear advantage. While resources from the superpowers enhanced the fighting
abilities of both sides, neither contribution was sufficient to tip the military balance.
Additionally, the peace agreements in the 1990s allowed the combatants to reorganize
and resupply when they found themselves on the defensive. The conflict settled to
stalemate with both sides adhering to their policies of defection from the peace
agreements despite the presence of UN forces.
The main incentives for defection were the monetary gains to be made from
mineral resources, including both oil and diamonds. UNITA financed its military
operations through the illicit trade of diamonds. The international diamond
community went so far as to help protect UNITA-controlled diamond mines with
helicopter gunships provided by British Mine Police, an organization working with
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De Beers. 23 On the other hand, the government was able to finance the war through
the discovery of large offshore deposits of oil - immune from attacks by rebels
because of its offshore location. This made investment from foreign oil companies
attractive since equipment and employees were safe from the fighting. It is important
to note that the oil did more than just create revenue for the government. Government
officials negotiated arms contracts - paid for by the oil revenue - and in the process
gained commissions that reached as much as millions of dollars per deal. 24
Therefore, prolonging the war allowed officials to justify spending oil revenue on
arms, thereby increasing their number of commissions.
US support for UNITA began to weaken once UNITA defected from the
Bicesse Agreement. It is critical to understand that the international community,
while unwilling to admit any fault of its own, was keen to place blame for the
outbreak of violence in 1992. UNITA was an easy target. While the international
community was reluctant to intervene directly in the conflict, this did not prevent
indirect intervention. For the first time the US acknowledged the MPLA as the
legitimate government of Angola officially marking the end of US support for
UNITA. Following this, the UN Security Council (UNSC) levied weapon sanctions
against UNITA and imposed an embargo against its diamond trades.
With the shifting of US support to the government, clearly the strategic
environment had altered. UNITA was now effectively cut off from its arms supplies
and its capacity to generate revenue was diminished. To make matters worse for
Ndumbe, 56.
Anna Richardson, "Angola's Oil Boom Fuels Civil War," The Independent (London), (Feb 27, 2000).
http://www.findarticles.com (accessed March 19, 2007).
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UNITA, the discovery of offshore oil gave the international community, especially
the US and Britain, an incentive to support the government. Soon, revenues from oil
income were being spent on technologically advanced weaponry. With the tacit
consent of the international community, the Angolan government undertook a
massive campaign against UNITA with no regard for humanitarian concerns. This
lead to the death of Savimbi and UNITA was virtually unable to continue the
fighting.
On March 13, 2002, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire and the
fighting officially ended. On August 26, the parties signed the "Memorandum of
Commitment for the Final Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol," which finalized
minor changes made to the Protocol in the previous months. Finally, on November
21 the UN declared that the peace process had concluded.
Somalia
In 1991, the United Somali Congress (USC) overthrew Siad Barre and a new
government was proclaimed with Ali Mahdi as leader. Mahdi's government was not
in control of the entire country, however, and other opposition groups refused to
recognize its authority. Chief among these groups was a faction of the USC lead by
Mohammad Farrah Aideed. With Mahdi and Aideed controlling different parts of
Mogadishu and the country, the conflict for control of government power continued.
Despite numerous attempts at peace between 1993 and 2004 Somalia remained
without an official government.
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The conflict was soon mired in stalemate due to the fractured nature of
Somalian society. While Mahdi and Aideed's factions were the primary combatants,
there were numerous groups involved. Evidence of this is to be found in a 1997
peace agreement signed by twenty-two faction leaders. Nevertheless, progress was
made and a Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000 fueled by
the development of a new partnership between Mahdi and Aideed. 25 Any hope for
the restoration of peace was short-lived as opposition groups boycotted the TNG,
forming an umbrella group know as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration
Council (SRRC). By 2003, the mandate for the TNG lapsed, an official government
failed to materialize, and the low-level conflict continued between militia and clan
factions.
As with numerous other African conflicts, economic incentives played a key
role in prolonging the Somalian conflict. While common war commodities such as
diamonds or gold were not a factor, other resources were available. The southern
regions of Somalia prior to and early in the conflict were fertile grounds for the
growth of bananas. In 1990 alone, the banana industry accounted for over $25
million in exports and employed over 10,000 workers. 26 Faction leaders anxious to
tap into this monetary source created export taxes and began a system of
protectionism. Multinational corporations (MNC) operating the plantations were
forced to hire personal militias in order to protect both land and transported goods.
25

The elder Aideed died in 1996 and his. son Hussein Aideed took his place. This had little effect on
the strategic environment as fighting continued between the two factions. From this point, all
references to Aideed are referring to the son rather than the father.
26
Christian Webersik, "Fighting for the Plenty: The Banana Trade in Southern Somalia," Oxford
Development Studies, 33: I (March 2005), 85.
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Furthermore, once its goods reached the ports for shipment, the militia controlling the
port levied an export tax. The Aideed faction was particularly successful and revenue
from this action began to tip the military balance in Mogadishu. Mahdi intervened
militarily and soon the MNCs abandoned their fields as the costs of protection rose
steeply. The battle over ports and taxes of other cash crops continued as militia
leaders profited by defecting from peace agreements.
One of the most infamous moments of the conflict occurred when the
international community intervened. In 1992, brutal fighting combined with a
draught led to severe famine. The UN responded to the crisis by launching the United
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Aideed's USC faction opposed the
presence of UN troops and began launching attacks. In response, Operation Restore
Hope was initiated by the US, which included 28,000 US and another 17,000
international troops. Following the death of twenty-five UN troops in 1993, the US
launched an attack aimed at capturing Aideed. The resulting fight left hundreds of
Somalis dead along with eighteen US soldiers. With the international media
broadcasting scenes of the US soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the
US soon withdrew its troops in 1994. The UN troops that remained played a minor
role in the conflict and were quietly removed by 1995. While the intervention saved
countless lives through much needed humanitarian aid, little was done to alter the
strategic environment as the combatants continued fighting.
While direct intervention failed to end the conflict, something of a status quo
emerged. War gave way to low-level conflict as informal institutions replaced the
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central government in controlling disputes. Clan, kin, and religious connections held
society together as Somalia transformed into a collection of city-states. Businessmen
were at the forefront of this development as they realized full-scale conflict was bad
for business, although low-level conflict was acceptable. Even with this
development, there were clear economic incentives for continuing conflict and
opposing the formation of a central government. Businessmen make money from
monopolies and taxes, revenue any government would tap into to fund its operations.
Living in Somalia remained dangerous as both clan and militia violence
persisted as a regular feature of life. The 2006 invasion by Ethiopia once again
submerged the country into the same high-intensity conflict that brought about the
humanitarian crises of the early 1990s. As of mid-2007, it is too early to tell how this
development will affect Somalia. Although, it is clear that a long-term insurgency
had begun, thereby ensuring the continuation of conflict.
ANALYSIS
In each case, there was at least one attempt at peace negotiations. These
negotiations led to peace agreements that generally collapsed in short order. An
actor's decision to either cooperate or defect from an agreement conforms to a
Prisoner's Dilemma. In its classic form, the dilemma offers the greatest combined
payoff for actors who cooperate as shown in Table 1. The table represents two actors
in the dilemma with the payoff structure based on a zero-to-five scale.
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Table 1: Traditional Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Structure
Cooperate

Defect

A = 3,

A = O,

B=3

B=5

A = 5,

A = 1,

B=O

B

Cooperate

Defect

=

1

Note: A represents the row player, while B represents the column player.
Logically, one would assume that through repeated interactions, actors would begin
to realize the potential payoffs of cooperation. Axelrod's work shows this to be the
case. While this conclusion may hold for the traditional dilemma, repeated failures in
African failed states suggest otherwise.
While the overall structure of the dilemma remains the same, there is a
difference in the payoffs. The different payoff structure is show in Table 2.

Table 2: Payoff Structure in African Failed States

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

Defect

A = 1,

A = O,

B=l

B=5

A = 5,

A = 3,

B=O

B

=

3

Note: A represents the row player, while B represents the column player.
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It can be seen that cells one and four have reversed and the greatest combined payoff
is offered through mutual defection. Uncertainty, distrust, and economic motivations
all serve to alter the strategic environment. Ultimately, actors will give-in to short
term gains rather than wait for uncertain long-term gains. Why is this true?
A more in-depth look into the incentive structure facing the actors reveals
some insights. The government can either cooperate or defect from a peace
agreement. If it cooperates, generally the rebels form an opposition and participate in
a power-sharing arrangement. While overall the government has defended its
majority hold on power, it nevertheless must give up ministerial posts. In rent
seeking states, power means the ability to allocate resources to friends, clan members,
party members and other clients. Hence, a concession by the government of any
ministerial positions also means a concession of the power and privileges that
accompanies them. If the government continues fighting, it faces possible backlash
from the international community, in tum creating sympathy for the rebels. However,
defection also allows the government to continue cashing in on arms deals or the
trade of other commodities such as diamonds or drugs. Therefore, the government
faces a situation in which it could lose both economic and political power through
cooperation. This favors defection, the option that reduces the likelihood of the loss
of either.
Conversely, the rebels have the same decision to make. If they choose to
cooperate, generally they disarm and form an opposition party to take part in a power
sharing government. While this certainly increases the group's power and prestige,
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ultimately it falls short of a control of government. If the rebels choose defection,
like the government, they can continue to enjoy the monetary gains from trading war
commodities. Additionally, there is hope that continued fighting would weaken the
government to the point of collapse at which point they could fill the power void. A
final point for consideration is that if the rebels choose to cooperate and disarm, they
become defenseless against the effects of government defection. Therefore, the
incentive structure favors defection.
The question remains of how to deal with this new payoff structure. What is
necessary is to create incentives for cooperation that outweigh short-term incentive
through defection. The cases suggest that this can be accomplished through
intervention. However, this paper argues that the nature of the short-term incentives
might affect the effectiveness of intervention. It is imperative to revisit the two
hypotheses.
First, it was hypothesized that intervention will be most effective in conflicts
where the involved parties are motivated by economic incentives and the international
community actively supports only one party. Second, it was hypothesized that
intervention will be ineffective in conflicts where ethnic tensions are present. Critical
to determining which hypotheses better explains the results in the four cases is the
nature of their conflicts.
From the cases, it is obvious that ethnic tensions were present. The genocides
witnessed in Angola, the DRC, and Somalia lends support to this. Furthermore, in
both the DRC and Somalia, ethnic identity served as an organizational tool and was
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utilized to recruit fighters. While the ethnic dynamics cannot be ignored, it is
important to determine whether they were driving the conflicts.
All four cases show that economic incentives trumped ethnic tensions. Both
of the conflicts in the DRC were sparked by grievances. Mobutu's support of Hutu
rebels attacking Rwanda led to the first war and Laurent Kabila's anti-Tutsi policies
led to the second. However, grievance quickly gave way to greed. Therefore, the
best explanation for the duration and intensity of the conflict is the country's vast
resources. 27 A similar conclusion can be applied to Somalia. While ethnic and clan
affiliation became an important part of daily survival, this resulted from the lack of a
state. When the conflict was at its highest intensity between 1992 and 1998, it was
driven by economic motives such as controlling export taxes. 28 In Angola, the ethnic
tensions surfaced mainly in the war dominated by Cold War politics and the pursuit
of oil and diamonds dominated the war throughout the 1990s. Finally, the conflict in
Sierra Leone had its origins in socio-economic divisions rather than ethnic identities
and control of the diamond mines became the main goal for reconciling those
divisions.
The ethnic dynamics brought into question by the alternative hypothesis
seemed an appropriate explanation for the long duration of conflicts in Africa.
However, the evidence shows that while ethnicity is an effective way to disperse
resources and recruit fighters, ultimately greed drives the conflicts. That suggests that
economic incentives can overcome ethnic identities.
27
28

Olsson, 322.
Webersik, 95.
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While it is clear that economic incentives drive the conflicts in question, the
primary hypothesis contains a second element: one-sided intervention. The cases
show that intervention, regardless of whether regional or international, fails to end the
conflict when support is given to both sides. Intervention can also fail if the
intervener attempts to act as a neutral party to the conflict. In Angola, the support
from the superpowers cancelled out one another, while in the DRC the intervention
by Angola and Zimbabwe saved the government from attacks by Rwanda and
Uganda. The early intervention in Sierra Leone by ECOWAS troops failed to prevent
the RUF from continuing the conflict, or even preventing the eventual military coup
in Freetown. In fact, the cases suggest that one-sided intervention can be an effective
means to ending conflict.
Dependent upon the situation, two main types of intervention are possible.
One type is the direct intervention employed by the British in Sierra Leone. This case
showed how a small but effective force could embolden both government and UN
forces. Additionally, it appeared that the British force would be in place long-term,
thus presenting the rebels with a formidable fighting unit. This was enough to tip the
military balance in Sierra Leone. Soon, Sankoh was captured and the RUF was
brought back to the bargaining table for the last time. However, the case also
suggests that the long-term commitment of troops is a necessity for success. The
unwillingness of the US to maintain its presence in Somalia after the death of
eighteen soldiers was a key factor in the failure to end the conflict. The international
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force had already proved effective at relieving humanitarian pressure; however,
without American support its peacekeeping mission was bound to fail.
The second type of intervention is the indirect intervention that was
successfully utilized in Angola. When US support shifted to the government, UNITA
soon faced economic and military embargoes. Making matters worse was the ability
of the government to buy advanced military technology with its oil revenues. These
changes along with the death of Savimbi left UNITA-with a strong incentive to
cooperate. A similar change took place in the DRC with the ascension of Joseph
Kabila. The younger Kabila lacked the predatory nature of his father and valued
peace over looting the Congo's resources. With strong diplomatic pressure and the
promise of a significant peacekeeping force from the UN, Kabila was able to engineer
the removal of the occupying troops. Without the direct support from these troops,
the rebel groups in the DRC were unable to remain effective fighting forces and
agreed to the power-sharing arrangement they had fought against for so long.
These interventions altered the strategic environment and the rebels
recalculated the payoffs they faced. On one hand, they could lose both monetary
gains from illicit trade and arms due to sanctions. On the other hand, the increased
strength of the government through superior military equipment or direct foreign
troop support made government collapse and survival dubious. Soon, the gains
through cooperation and acceptance of the previous peace agreement were more
appealing. Ultimately, as the cases of the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Angola show, the
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final agreements signed are often proclamations reaffirming the initial peace
agreements accompanied by minor changes.
CONCLUSION
This study has presented two main questions. First, what are the incentives to
continue fighting once stalemate is reached and peace agreements have been signed?
Clearly, the case studies show that economic incentives play a crucial role in
prolonging conflicts. Both governments and rebels receive large revenues from arms
deals, trading war commodities, and rent-seeking behavior. It is difficult for any
peace agreement to displace these incentives. In addition, both sides distrust their
counterparts and fear that cooperation will end their access to resources.
Second, how can the costs of defection be raised to the point were cooperation
becomes the best strategy? Intervention on the side of one combatant or the other, if
used properly, is an effective policy for raising the costs of defection. Through this
intervention, whether direct or indirect, the strategic environment is altered and the
payoffs facing the actors change accordingly. Ultimately, defection is no longer
effective and a strategy of cooperation will offer the greatest rewards.
St. Augustine once wrote that, "For even they who intentionally interrupt the
peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into
a peace that suits them better."29 This statement aptly sums up the conflicts in
African failed states. Until a peace minimally acceptable to all is found, the conflicts
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St. Augustine, The City of God. trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1994), 687.
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will persist and the international community will be needed to exert its power and
alter the payoffs facing these war-tom states.
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